Byzantine Agreement introduced in [Pease, Shostak, Lamport, 80] is a widely used building block of reliable distributed protocols. It simulates broadcast despite the presence of faulty parties within the network, traditionally using only private unicast links. Under such conditions, Byzantine Agreement requires more than 2/3 of the parties to be compliant. [Fitzi, Maurer, 00], constructed a Byzantine Agreement protocol for any compliant majority based on an additional primitive allowing transmission to any two parties simultaneously. They proposed a problem of generalizing these results to wider channels and fewer compliant parties. We prove that 2f < kh condition is necessary and sufficient for implementing broadcast with h compliant and f faulty parties using k-cast channels.
Introduction
Broadcast primitives play a special role in multiplayer game theory as an integral component in the fault-tolerant implementation of game protocols. Given a compliant majority, broadcast and private channels are sufficient to simulate any multi-party computation [Rabin, 89 ], based on [Goldreich, Micali, Wigderson, 87] , and [Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Wigderson, 88] . With additional primitives, such as private and oblivious transfer channels, even a majority of faulty parties can be tolerated [Beaver, Goldwasser, 89] , [Goldwasser, Levin. 90 ].
Since reliable hardware solution is a strong assumption, Byzantine Agreement protocols simulate broadcast on networks with faulty parties. Given only private channels, Byzantine Agreement is possible if and only if faulty parties are in a < 1/3 minority ([Pease, Shostak, Lamport, 80]). For this reason, protocols tolerant to more faults generally assume broadcast as a primitive.
Various hardware assumptions and communication goals were studied in the literature. For instance, [Angluin 80 ], [Goldreich, Goldwasser, Linial 91], [Franklin, Yung 95] and other papers studied problems of private communication on an incomplete broadcast network. [Franklin, Wright 98] showed that such a network with p disjoint paths from sender to receiver could tolerate < p/2 faulty parties. [Wang, Desmedt 01] showed that < p faulty parties could be handled with probabilistic reliability.
The broadcast primitive is rather special in that, unlike other common primitives, it involves an unlimited number of parties. This suggests exploring the power of a limited version of broadcast, with a constant number of recipients. Assuming any compliant majority, [Fitzi, Maurer , 00] used a 3-party broadcast primitive to simulate full broadcast. They asked what fraction of compliant parties would be required given wider broadcast primitives. This is especially interesting in view of results (e.g. [2, 11] ) that convert arbitrary protocols into equivalent ones with added tolerance to any faulty majorities, assuming the availability of broadcasts and two-party primitives, such as oblivious transfer and private channels. We show that broadcast with h compliant and f faulty parties can be implemented using k-cast channels if and only if 2f < kh.
Definitions and Results
Definition 1 A k-cast channel is a primitive for authenticated reliable communication to k parties. To use it, one party, the sender, selects k recipients, and a message m. Each recipient gets m, as well as the identities of the sender and the other recipients.
Definition 2 A protocol is an algorithm used in rounds by several communicating parties. Each party starts with an input appended with its and other parties' identities. At each round, parties can k-cast messages to be used by the recipients as inputs for the next round. Besides the algorithm, the interaction is affected by the Adversary who selects the initial inputs of all parties and assigns, possibly with restrictions, their loyalties, i.e., chooses a subset of faulty parties and replaces their communications (inputs, messages, and outputs) by data of its choice.
Definition 3 Byzantine agreement is a broadcast simulating protocol. The party's value is its output for a recipient or input for the sender. The protocol succeeds if the values of non-faulty (compliant) parties are all identical.
Theorem 1 Byzantine agreement protocols for h compliant and f faulty parties using k-cast channels exist if and only if 2f < kh.
Broadcast and Consensus
In a traditional consensus model, each party starts with an input value. After running a consensus protocol, all compliant parties output values consistent with each other and with an input of at least one compliant party. With a compliant majority, consensus is easily shown to be equivalent to broadcast. To achieve consensus, each party broadcasts its value to the others who then output the majority value. To broadcast, the sender sends its input to all parties, who then run a consensus protocol on the values received.
This equivalence fails when the majority is faulty. The Adversary gives inputs 0 and 1 to an equal number of parties. They all run the protocol faithfully. The Adversary defeats the consensus by keeping compliant some parties with different outputs or declaring faulty all parties whose inputs match the uniform output.
One can generalize the consensus model, by assuming each party to have not just one input or output value but rather a distribution, i.e., a value for each k-node set he belongs to. All compliant members of the set get the same input value for it. All output values of compliant parties must agree with each other and with at least one input of a compliant party. This model can simulate broadcast after the sender distributes his input, i.e., k-casts it to all k-node sets.
Proof of the Lower Bound

Big Rings and Chains
The Adversary's ability to defy the agreement will depend on having enough parties to build a big ring. A (k, h)-ring is a set of k + 2 or more clusters of parties where the clusters are arranged in a cycle, with at least h parties in any two adjacent clusters. These bounds assure that no message can be sent to all clusters, and all compliant parties can fit in any two adjacent clusters. Adding up parties in all pairs of consecutive clusters, we get (k+2)h or more, counting each party twice. So, to build the ring, the Adversary needs f + h ≥ (k + 2)h/2 parties, which means 2f ≥ kh. A (k, h)-ring could be opened into a (k, h)-chain by duplicating all nodes in the sender's cluster S, creating two clusters, S 0 and S 1 .
The Adversary Strategy
The Adversary defeats any protocol P if 2f ≥ kh. It arranges the parties into a (k, h)-chain, duplicating the sender's cluster S as in section 3.1. One copy of S will end up being sim-ulated by the adversary. Both copies play the same part in protocol P, receiving duplicate messages from other clusters. The two copies of the sender get opposite inputs. The messages from S are generated by both copies, but one copy is intercepted by the Adversary as follows.
Each transmission from S misses all parties in at least one other cluster. Discounting the leftmost such cluster splits the chain into two subchains: C 0 and C 1 . The Adversary will keep compliant two adjacent clusters, so either C 0 or C 1 will have no compliant parties. Thus the Adversary can and does intercept the messages from S m to C 1−m .
With these restrictions on the Adversary, no messages or outputs depend on its choice of compliant parties. Since the values of the S 0 and S 1 copies of the sender differ, there must be parties in adjacent clusters that disagree on their value. The Adversary defeats the protocol by choosing the conflicting clusters as compliant, corrupting all others.
Proof of the Upper Bound
We describe a Byzantine protocol P h for h compliant and f = ⌈kh/2⌉ − 1 faulty parties. It can also run with fewer, n < h + f , parties, and is still guaranteed to succeed, provided all d = h+f−n missing parties are counted as faulty if the sender s (who will represent the missing parties) is faulty. P starts with s distributing its input, and uses the following concept of trust graphs.
Trust Graphs
A trust graph is formed by each party and links pairs of parties that report consistently inputs received from s by both. "Sender clusters" S m are added to the graph, each S m being a clique of 1+d nodes connected to all recipients who report uniform inputs m.
A pruning is then conducted as follows. Because the h compliant parties must form a clique, edges not in cliques can be removed. Since cliques are hard to detect, we remove instead (until none left) edges (a, b) that do not belong to any bi-star i.e., an h-node star with two centers a, b (adjacent to all its nodes).
We use trust graphs to choose agreement values. All compliant parties must be adjacent in the graph. If, in their respective graphs, compliant recipients have paths to a unique sender cluster, they may immediately output its value.
Consider a path connecting nodes in S m with different m, say, S 0 and S 1 . It must have more than k recipients. Otherwise there would be one k-cast received by them all; since parties connected to S m claim this k-cast was m, there must be some disagreement along this path.
One can break S 0 , S 1 and the recipients into clusters according to the distance from S 0 , dropping nodes more distant than S 1 . They form a (k, h)-chain, since every two consecutive clusters include an h-node bi-star. So, by section 3.1, a trust graph with a path between S 0 and S 1 implies 2f ≥ kh.
The Protocol
Each party i distributes all messages M i it received from s. Then all parties except s run P h recursively to agree on M i and form trust graphs based on the agreed M i 's. Let n be the minimal number of parties for which the guarantee for P h can fail. Then the agreement on M i succeeds unless s is compliant and i faulty.
Thus, the compliant parties always form a clique, and if s is not among them, the graphs are identical. Then each party with a path to S m outputs m, or 0, if no such paths exist. The agreement can fail only if a path connects both S m . As per Section 4.1, this contradicts 2f < kh.
